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1. Introduction 
 
The current volume aims to explore the idea of inter-legality from one particular perspective: that of the judge. 
What is a judge to do when confronted with two (or more) rules coming from different jurisdictions, all of them 
potentially applicable to the case at hand, yet pointing to different substantive solutions? The intuitions 
underlying this volume, inspired (as intuitions usually are) by some empirical developments are, first, that 
judges are increasingly confronted with such situations, and second, might increasingly be inclined in such 
cases no to resort to solutions on a purely formal basis (Is one of the legal orders concerned hierarchically 
superior? Is one of the rules concerned hierarchically superior?), but rather on a more substantive basis, aiming 
to justice in the case before them. In different and simultaneously more and less abstract terms, confronted 
with a conflict between rules stemming from, say, international law on the one hand and a particular domestic 
legal system on the other, judges are increasingly inclined not to decide on the basis of international law being 
superior or inferior, but on the basis of asking themselves what best serves justice in the individual, particular 
case. 
This is made possible precisely by being ‘casuistic’, in the non-pejorative sense of the term.1 A focus on 
individual cases, with their particular characteristics, does not demand that the judge possesses and commands 
a thick background theory of justice; it only requires, more modestly, that a judge (or college of judges) is able 
to distinguish between several possible outcomes which ones would be more just, more fair, more equitable. 
Hence, inter-legality is a highly contextualized and pragmatic setting, philosophically to be associated with 
Aristotle rather than Kant, Dewey rather than Rawls. There are no doubt outstanding philosophical questions 
that remain to be answered, but these are less heavy, less impeding of practices, than if the demand were to 
apply a theory of justice – for it seems ascertainable that no theory of justice has met with general acceptance.  
The perspective chosen is that of the judge. This is not done in order to sanctify the position of judges or 
because, as many may think, ‘law is what judges do’, but has different motivations. The most important of 
these is purely heuristic: judges are, generally speaking, under an obligation to decide in accordance with the 
law, and only in accordance with the law. Where the policy-maker can and often must take other 
considerations into account (social consequences, economic feasibility, ethical plausibility, political 
acceptability), the textbook judge operates under no such constraints. Hence, for testing an idea in the sphere 
of law, the courts and their judges offer a more isolated laboratory than many other settings.  
The ramification is that our conception of inter-legality, at least for present purposes, differs from the 
conception used as used by others. To us, inter-legality offers a legal solution (a solution embedded within the 
law and justified by the law) to certain practical questions. It does not offer a political solution, to be taken by 
                                                             
1 See e.g. the conception endorsed (if not invariably under the label ‘casuistry’) by Stephen Toulmin, The Place of Reason 
in Ethics (Chicago Il: University of Chicago Press, 1986 [1950]). 
legal actors, but instead offers a solution based on law. Put differently: the judge in inter-legality does not step 
outside the law (as in many versions of legal pluralism), but stays within its limits. 
Another ramification is this: for purposes of this volume, inter-legality is not a matter of discontented 
individuals and groups being able to seek the jurisdiction most favourable to their claim (although, as will be 
discussed below, the term was probably conceived with this in mind by its auctor intellectualis). Indeed, in an 
important sense, for us such is not a realistic possibility, for the very point of inter-legality is that the law will 
indicate the solution to a dispute, not by choosing from among various equally just solutions, but by pointing 
out which one is the more just. And if that is so, then ‘forum-shopping’ becomes a risky activity for the forum-
shopper. 
This introduction will discuss the emergence of inter-legality against the background of the heated, intense but 
short-lived constitutionalization discussion that pre-occupied international lawyers in the first decade of the 
2000s2, based on the thought that while the discussion died away, some of the questions it attempted to 
answer remained, and are better seen as emanations of inter-legality (section 2). It will move on to a discussion 
of the launching and reception of the term ‘inter-legality’ and the pioneering work of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in giving effect to it, in particular in its case-law on external relations, as well as brief 
discussion of some of the overlaps and linkages with similar notions (pluralism, constitutionalism, 
fragmentation – section 3). Section 4 introduces the contributions to this volume. 
 
2. Constitutional Inspirations 
 
About a decade ago, international lawyers – and many domestic lawyers with an interest in public affairs - were 
in the grip of a seemingly new idea: the idea that the international legal order could be seen as a constitutional 
order. The idea had many inspirations. For some, constitutionalization was the answer to fragmentation of 
international law, widely seen as a threat to the integrity of the system – constitutionalization would be the 
glue to hold the fragmenting system together. For others, it marked the liberal end of history, with a world 
finally united on the basis of shared values, typically western civil and political rights, or even the ordo-liberal 
rights to trade, own property and do business. For a third group, the constitutionalization of international law 
finally made good on a classic promise, uttered by the likes of Pufendorf and Wolff and resurrected in the 
twentieth century by Verdross and others. A fourth group felt that constitutionalization might provide an 
answer to all sorts of challenges: the sources challenge (What is international law and how do we tell it when 
we see it), the subjects challenge (Who is actually making international law), the enforcement challenge (Is 
international law really law if it is not enforced?) and the ontological challenge (Is international law, indeed and 
again, this time as a philosophical matter really law?). And a fifth group embraced constitutionalization as an 
ideology, required to accompany that other great ideology of globalization. For in a globalizing world without a 
state, as someone might have put it, something was needed to sell the idea – and that something could be 
constitutionalization.3 Indeed, the election of Donald Trump in the United States and the Brexit decision in the 
United Kingdom may well be signs that the salesmen have stopped their work: globalization meets with 
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Theory (forthcoming). 
3 See generally Jan Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’, in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization 
of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) 1-44. 
resistance because it is not met with a partner discourse to legitimize it beyond the unsubstantiated claim that 
globalization makes us all better off, that ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’, neglecting the awkward circumstance that 
some boats are lifted far higher than others. And for many, of course, constitutionalization answered several of 
these challenges at once. 
And yet, it seems the conversation has come to a complete stop – who won? International lawyers debate all 
sorts of things these days, but they do not debate constitutionalization. So what happened? Why has 
constitutionalization seemingly disappeared completely? Obviously, the different attractions have met with 
different sorts of disappointments. Die-hard liberals may have started to realize that human rights, even if 
universal, may be contextual, and may be just a little too open-ended. They may have even started to realize 
that human rights come with their own bureaucracies which may not always be unequivocally good or human-
rights oriented. Those who worried about fragmentation may have stopped worrying a little; they may have 
been appeased by the invention of the principle of systemic integration laid down in the Vienna Convention, 
and they may have found that the world does not collapse if trade lawyers and environmentalists talk past 
each other.4 This may be inconvenient, but hardly cause for hysteria. Those who re-imagined a civitas mundi 
may still be working on their re-imagining, and if globalization has lost some of its glamour, so has 
constitutionalization. 
But perhaps the main reason is that most of the attempts to look for constitutionalization aimed to posit a 
thick, monolithic version of constitutionalization, implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) based on global unity, on 
a worldwide convergence of values. This now has proved fallacious, as various theorists have pointed out. The 
world is a pluralist place, with pluralism existing on various levels, from the epistemological pluralism identified 
by someone like Neil Walker5 and the conceptual pluralism of the philosophers6 to more mundane pluralities 
spotted by Nico Krisch.7 So, it turned out, much of the debate was based on false premises, on the false 
premise of planetary unity, happily ignoring or at least downplaying clashes of civilizations, happily ignoring 
above all perhaps the political economy of (international) law: whatever is done, whatever is proposed, it 
comes with winners and losers, and the identity of those groups remain remarkably constant over time. 
Political decisions are rarely ‘neutral’; they tend to have distributive effects, even if sometimes unintentionally 
so. The West wins – and would have gained most from constitutionalization, cementing western values and 
western political practices. And the global South loses – and continues to lose.8 
Still, while constitutionalization did not answer many questions and the entire decade-long debate may have 
been based on false premises, nonetheless it did tap into something real and of significance. And the real and 
significant thing it tapped into was the idea that it is no longer clear who exercises international authority, how 
authority is exercised, and with what justification. Clearly, the old Westphalian state-system, built around 
keywords such as sovereign equality, national democracy, dualism, hierarchy, and state consent, did no longer 
                                                             
4 The principle of systemic integration was popularized upon the discovery of article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, suggesting that in interpreting a treaty, all rules of international law applicable between the parties 
ought to be taken into consideration. See Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission (Helsinki: Erik Castrén Institute, 2007). 
5 See Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
6 See Hilary Putnam, Ethics without Ontology (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
7 See Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
8 For a forceful critique, see B.S. Chimni, International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary Approaches, 2nd 
edn. (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
do the trick. Authority, so we started to think, could come from all angles and directions, and seemed 
increasingly problematic to legitimate. If traditionally states could claim legitimate authority based on their 
internal structures, and international law could claim legitimacy because it was made by those same states and 
by definition and necessity based on their consent, this story no longer held good. It could not explain why all 
of a sudden banking standards would be set by the highly selective (and self-selective at that) Basel Committee 
and in the form of guidelines rather than legal rules. It could not explain the legal significance of ‘standards’ 
developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), or the Forest Stewardship Council, or 
the private agreement between workers and employers concerning safety in the garment industry. It could not 
explain why states would get all worked up whenever the OECD would publish its annual PISA rankings – not 
even recommendations, but mere rankings. It could not explain how athletes convicted of doping use by their 
own sports governing bodies could appeal to national or supranational tribunals.9 And it could not explain why 
individuals would be bound to respect sanctions imposed on them by the Security Council, all the more so if 
those sanctions were taken in disregard of fundamental norms prevailing in their own political communities. 
In other words, behind the challenges mentioned above lay another, deeper and possibly more fundamental 
issue: how to come to terms with changing patterns of authority and legitimation in international law? In 
particular, what to do with norms coming at us from various directions, from various legal systems or more 
broadly from various normative orders (law, ethics, social customs, religion)? If there was one thing 
constitutionalization promised, it was the idea of hierarchy and order: the wide variety of norms could fall into 
place in a constitutional global legal order, with some at the apex and others below it, following some 
hierarchical pattern or others. Obviously, one might quibble (and one might expect there to be quibbles) about 
which norms would occupy which positions, but the long and the short would be that constitutionalization 
circa 2006 offered a glimpse of a well-arranged international legal order, with a beginning, a middle, and an 
end – and in that order too. 
This promise, needless to say, has not materialized, but the problematique has not been resolved either. In 
fact, it has only become more visible. The Kadi decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
CJEU in 2008 illustrated things nicely, presenting the intricate interdependence between three distinct legal 
orders (the international, the EU, and the national) and, what is more, suggesting that old solutions would no 
longer be workable. For at the end of the day, none of the options would do justice to all factors concerned. 
Honouring the Security Council would have come at the expense of human rights; honouring Swedish law 
would have meant ignoring Sweden’s EU obligations; and honouring EU law, as the CJEU eventually did, ended 
up ignoring international law – and not just any international law, but the law relating to peace and security, 
hierarchically often considered superior to the law of the EU’s member states by virtue of article 103 UN 
Charter. 
The Kadi case hit a nerve – in fact, it hit several nerves; few judicial decisions have occupied so many legal 
minds in recent years as the Kadi decision. And yet, for all the hoopla, Kadi too has fizzed out, much like the 
constitutionalization debate, perhaps because the saga kept continuing, or perhaps because the Security 
Council somewhat improved its human rights sensibilities. Curiously though, the very circumstance made so 
visible by Kadi (the interdependence between legal orders) has largely been left unexplored. There has been 
much debate about technicalities, and much searching for practical solutions in terms of hierarchy, with some 
advocating formal hierarchy (‘Surely the Charter should prevail’) and some advocating the opposite (‘Surely 
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human rights should prevail’; ‘Surely the Security Council may be disobeyed’10), and some looking further into 
review procedures and their relative merits and de-merits.11 But little attention has been paid to the 
circumstance that perhaps Kadi was not an incidental case bringing a strange and unusual configuration to the 
fore, but could rather represent ‘the new normal’. And yet, this is precisely what Kadi represents: the inter-
wovenness of legal orders is not unique and special anymore, but rather represents a quite common state of 
affairs. 
More recent cases confirm this state of affairs, in various ways. Human rights lawyers may think of the 2016 Al-
Dulimi decision of the ECtHR, confirming the interdependence between the UN, European and Swiss legal 
orders. Investment lawyers may be reminded of the Yukos saga, decided by an international arbitral panel but 
subsequently set aside by a Dutch court – appeal is pending at the time of writing - and involving issues of 
procedural and substantive international, Russian and Dutch law (and that is not even counting related 
proceedings taking place before domestic courts in various other national jurisdictions). Italy’s Constitutional 
Court saw fit not to give effect to a decision of the International Court of Justice, and saw fit to justify this by 
claiming to protect the integrity of international law itself. And the US Supreme Court did much the same in 
Medellín, but this time claiming to protect the integrity of US domestic law. This short list of examples makes 
clear that various legal systems can come into uncomfortably close contact with one another, and makes clear 
that those various legal systems can each of them claim supremacy over the competing legal orders. And these 
are just examples drawn from legal orders whose legal status no one would deny – the examples do not even 
involve soft law, or normative systems not everyone would consider as ‘law’. 
 
3. Inter-legality in Thought and Action 
 
Probably the first to use the term ‘inter-legality’ was the Portuguese legal sociologist Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos, during a keynote lecture presented some thirty years ago. Santos did not, however, do much with the 
word: He noted that inter-legality was a dynamic process due to the circumstance that ‘different legal spaces 
are non-synchronic’, but his main contribution was the coining and description of the term. He observed, three 
decades ago, that we should start to conceive of law as ‘different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated 
and mixed in our minds, as much as in our actions’, explaining that we ‘live in a time of porous legality or of 
legal porosity, multiple networks of legal orders forcing us to constant transitions and trespassing.’ And this 
was different, so he warned, from what legal anthropologists had traditionally referred to as legal pluralism, for 
legal pluralism suggests much more a side-by-side existence of legal orders coexisting in the same space.12 For 
Santos, inter-legality posed not so much a challenge as an opportunity: the porosity of legal orders would allow 
people to pick and choose which legal order to employ, and typically, they would employ the one most in tune 
with their claims or grievances.   
                                                             
10 See, e.g., Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions 
(Oxford University Press, 2011). 
11 See Devika Hovell, The Power of Process: The Value of Due Process in Security Council Sanctions Decision-Making (Oxford 
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chapter was first separately published in 1987. See also Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime-
Kollisionen: Zur Fragmentierung des globalen Rechts (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006) 34-40, distinguishing inter-
legality from traditional legal pluralism.  
The notion of inter-legality was picked up by William Twining on various occasions, but again without doing 
much with it. In his Globalization and Legal Theory, Twining suggests that it might provide a useful framework 
for further research, and then presents something of a broad outline before delving into a different debate.13 
And in a more recent brief article, Twining devotes some attention to classifying inter-legality, making three 
points (but alas making them rather briefly). First, he notes that neither change nor stability is presupposed in 
inter-legality. Second, he observes that different orders or spaces can live in conflict but also in harmony with 
each other. And third, he suggests that the different legal spaces may be relatively open: they behave more like 
waves or clouds than like billiard balls.14 All three seem apposite, with other authors, more pragmatically and 
more doctrinally oriented, having suggested that e.g. much international law depends on national law for its 
implementation, and that thus international and domestic law can together build a strong legal argument in 
favor or against particular practices.15  
Santos’ inter-legality may be a useful term, but it may be helpful to specify wherein its utility may lie. We take 
it that the term refers mostly to situations where actors are confronted with a variety of norms stemming from 
a variety of legal orders (or spaces), and all validly applicable in principle. If these all point in the same 
direction, then fine. The more interesting cases however are where these do not point in the same direction. 
Thus, Mr Kadi enjoyed certain rights under EU law (derived from both EU law and the human rights obligations 
of its member states), but a different set of rules emanating from the Security Council intervened with the 
enjoyment of these rights. In Italy, Mr Ferrara thought he had certain rights against Germany, valid under 
Italian law but, as the ICJ held, unenforceable against Germany under international law – something Italy’s 
Constitutional Court found difficult to swallow. The defining elements for inter-legality to operate then are 
threefold. One, it must concern a variety of norms from different systems; second, these are all valid within 
their own legal spheres; and third, they are in principle all applicable to a particular set of facts. Hence, inter-
legality involves a choice for the application of one set of rules over another, equally valid, set of rules.  
It is perhaps useful to point out that inter-legality does not, in and of itself, clarify much about what others 
refer to as transnational law: it may be the case that there is law originating from, say, the Basel Committee, or 
that what some deem ‘soft law’ is really hard law under a different name, but this is not something inter-
legality addresses. It works, so to speak, on existing ontological foundations of law, but does not amend these 
as such. In other words: it speaks to contacts between legal orders or spaces, but does not itself decide what 
counts as a legal order. It aims to describe and perhaps explain legal relations, not legal orders or systems or 
spaces. In this sense, its next of kin are the classic doctrines of monism and dualism (more on these below). 
Yet, monism and dualism are no longer sufficient. For one thing, both doctrines were always premised on the 
thought that there were only two relevant legal spaces to consider: the international and the national. This is 
no longer tenable, with different legal orders in-between asserting a role: this applies to EU law, but also, quite 
separately, to the European public order established under the European Convention of Human Rights. And 
while Europe might be most pronounced here, the matter is not limited to Europe: one may discern an 
American public order based on the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights; UN missions in Africa are 
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demonstrating that some international rules require the help of domestic law in order to be enforced. 
often intersected by regional organizations such as the African Union or ECOWAS – it is too simple, these days, 
to merely proclaim the relevance of the national and the international. 
To this a second factor may be added: it is likewise too simple these days to invoke notions of normative 
hierarchy in order to decide which law should be applied to which set of circumstances. There are various 
reasons why this is so. First, it is increasingly realized that facts rarely speak for themselves; instead, they 
require some kind of classification before they can meaningfully be discussed, and even then, our language is 
often an impediment, in that neutral classifications are often out of reach.16 This classification is a human act, 
and thus a political act: hence, the so-called ‘politics of framing’ assumes increasing relevance. The upshot of 
this is that the validity of a particular legal approach is only ever provisionally accepted: applying this norm to 
these facts is only accepted if the result is not too obnoxious. Should the result be obnoxious, then the 
legitimacy of the earlier decision dissipates, and it will be suggested that a different frame should have been 
applied. Thus, approaching the HIV/Aids problematique as a matter of intellectual property law is not 
problematic per se, provided it results in a decent solution. If not, people will suggest it should have been 
approached as a health issue, or a human rights issue, or perhaps even a security issue.17 Where in earlier days 
frames were by and large uncontested, this is no longer the case, and the contestability of the frame sets 
additional normative demands on the law. The legal solution must not only be technically competent (proper, 
solid application of intellectual property law to aids medication), but also be considered normatively 
acceptable, for when other frames are available, the chosen frame must be able to convince on grounds of 
fairness or justice – lest it be considered a mere exercise of naked power. 
Again, the Kadi case is a useful illustration. Technically, it would have been perfectly acceptable for the CJEU to 
declare the supremacy of the UN Charter, and ignore human rights standards – in fact, the argument could be 
made that technically, this would have been the most warranted solution, with the EU institutions simply 
implementing verbatim a Security Council resolution adopted in the fight against global terrorism – and if this 
results in human rights violations for the individuals blacklisted, then the onus is on the Council to get its act 
together, but not on the implementing entities to prevent implementation. Or so the argument could have 
gone.  
And one of the reasons why it is no longer considered possible to simply apply notions of hierarchy and ‘damn 
the torpedoes’, is the inexorable rise of the individual, or humanity, as the ‘alpha and omega of international 
law’, as it has recently been put.18 What we mean by this is not the sterile position which says that the 
individual has become a subject of international law – this means very little in the absence of concrete rights 
and obligations. Nor do we mean to say that the rights of individuals are trumps in any Dworkinian sense – 
obviously, they are not, and should not be. But what is of relevance is the realization that even if much 
international law is made by states to regulate relations between states, and even if much of this takes place 
within international organizations, nonetheless most of this international law ends up affecting individuals one 
way or another. Put differently, there are actually not that many substantive rules of international law that 
only apply to states in their international relations: there are the rules on diplomatic relations, and arguably 
rules on aggression and self-defense, but many rules of international law these days directly or indirectly, 
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actually or potentially, affect individuals and legal persons. This is obviously the case with human rights law, 
refugee law and the like, but applies equally to trade law, or investment law, or the law of the sea. 
This has, arguably, always been the case, and it is possibly no coincidence that early observers of the first 
international organizations, in the nineteenth century, already captured glimpses of ‘Weltrecht’ (or ‘global 
law’) in entities such as the International Copyright Union.19 Likewise, it is on reflection rather nonsensical to 
think of the work of the International Labour Organization as somehow unconnected to the rights of workers, 
or that the economic and social activities of the League of Nations would be limited to state relations only20: 
the interdependence of international and domestic law has remained hidden behind a layer of misguided 
International Relations Realism; and as so often, the lawyers have stopped thinking and simply embraced the 
Realist assumptions.21 
The upshot is, that it is no longer considered acceptable if and when the law is applied in such a way as to 
negatively affect individuals. As Italy’s Constitutional Court suggests, even the law on state immunity – 
traditionally the epitome of a state-centric international law – will come to affect individuals, and if that is the 
case, it should be applied with a sensitivity to the plight of those individuals. In this case, it concerned an Italian 
who had been forced to hard labour under the Nazi regime, and eventually started proceedings against 
Germany in Italy’s courts. Germany went to the ICJ and invoked sovereign immunity, something the ICJ 
honored, making a facile distinction between procedural rules (immunity) and substantive ones (slavery and 
forced labor) and suggesting that prioritizing the procedural rule would in no way diminish the value underlying 
the substantive rule. But this, as Italy’s Constitutional Court intimated, is no longer acceptable, as it cannot be 
reconciled with the very values underlying, and recognized by, international law.  
Hence, as it turns out, the individual is central to much of domestic law, and to much of international law as 
well (and EU law). As a result, the law that gets to be applied, so the argument seems to go, should be the law 
that actually is helpful to the individual, if necessary against the interests – and legitimate rights – of others. In 
yet other words, it is not the case that the law goes for a solution based on formal hierarchy; nor even is it the 
case that it goes for a solution based on substantive hierarchy; instead, what one sees emerging is a pragmatic 
analysis of the facts of the case based on, one might say, the epistemological priority of the individual. What 
matters is to do justice in individual cases, regardless of reflections about normative hierarchy. Notions of 
supremacy or jus cogens may come in to bolster the legal argumentation, but are not central to it (and, frankly, 
will mostly obscure matters at any rate). What is central, instead, is the position of the individual – it is the 
individual who has become the ‘constitutional irritant’ of each and every legal order.22  
It follows that our classic notions of monism and dualism are no longer particularly useful, a circumstance 
recognized by pluralists; intuitively, it is assumed that legal orders move from one to two to many: from 
monism to dualism to pluralism. Intriguingly however, it may well be this rests on a cognitive path dependency. 
Historically, at any rate, the sequence seems to have gone differently: the leading dualist, Heinrich von Triepel, 
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posited his dualism well before23 the leading theoretical monist (Hans Kelsen) responded24, and it is often also 
conveniently forgotten that Triepel presented his dualism not so much as a normative claim, but rather a an 
empirical claim: since, in his days, international law and domestic law were regarded (not always plausibly 
perhaps, but that is beside the point) as rarely meeting, dualism presented a convincing story, and it made 
sense to insist on the need to transform the commands of one legal order – the international - into commands 
recognized by the other – the domestic - insofar and to the extent that the subjects of the domestic order 
could directly be affected by the international order. Triepel himself held that such commands hardly existed, 
but acknowledged the possibility that the minority treaties, a recent phenomenon at the time he returned to 
the issue in the 1920s25, might grow into instruments of international law directly affecting domestic law – a 
position that would be strengthened a few years later by the analysis of a ‘Beamtenabkommen’ by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice a few years later.26 
In short, historically the sequence was not ‘one, two, many’, but rather counted backwards starting from two, 
and then the question is what follows after ‘one’. We posit that what follows is not pluralism as commonly 
understood, but a different form of monism – inter-legality. If classic Kelsenian monism posited the existence 
of a single legal order with different branches and with one of these – the international – being hierarchically 
superior as a matter of form27, our claim, in a nutshell, is that such hierarchical supremacy cannot be issued as 
a matter of form or descent, but has to be earned. In a world of inter-legality, courts will apply those rules 
which they will deem most conducive to doing justice in the individual case. This will sometimes be a rule of 
international law; and sometimes it will be a rule from domestic law, or EU law, or any other appropriate legal 
order as may be identified. 
Two points needs to be emphasized. First, few developments move in linear ways, from a concrete starting 
point without interruption to a concrete end point, and the same applies to inter-legality. There are enough 
decisions where courts will not put a premium to doing justice in the individual case, but rather in favour of 
other interests, whether those of other actors or interests those courts will deem to be systemic. In the long 
run, this will matter: if courts systematically end up not doing justice in cases crying out for inter-legality, then 
our ideas will be falsified. But it is too early to tell. We think we have identified something that could come to 
be a useful way of understanding what courts will do in cases where various conflicting commands may be 
present, and this volume contains our preliminary findings and attempts, with knowledgeable colleagues, to 
think things through. 
The second point is related: this volume is set up not so much as a normative proposal, but rather as 
explanatory theory. Admittedly, in legal matters the descriptive and the normative are never strictly separate, 
and the same applies here: to our minds, it is probably not a bad thing if our intuition proves credible. But 
clearly, as a normative theory, some important elements are lacking, not least a working concept of the sort of 
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‘justice’ that may be involved in ‘doing justice in individual cases’, and whether or not such a concept could 
meet with universal or near-universal approval.   
The epistemological priority of the individual and the emphasis on doing justice in individual cases has been 
pioneered, it should be acknowledged, by the CJEU, in particular in its case-law on external relations. Here, 
observers have long engaged in sterile debates about whether the EU is friendly disposed towards 
international law, or rather unfriendly disposed; whether it should be seen as monist or dualist in its case-law 
on the effect of international law in the EU legal order. In this debate, observers have often been puzzled by 
the apparent systemic (and systematic) inconsistencies in the case-law. Many have suggested that the CJEU 
was essentially monist, except when it comes to particular treaties, especially perhaps GATT/WTO law. But if 
so, some relatively recent decisions (including Kadi) do not fit the bill, which has prompted observers to 
identify a shift.28 Other observers, myself included, have rather considered the CJEU protective of the EU legal 
order, and I still maintain that this is the better view, but it deserves a nuance or two.29 
The first nuance is one of self-image: the EU thinks of itself as a nice liberal order and, among international 
entities, has a very well-developed mechanism in place on the judicial protection of individual rights and 
interests, while its substantive law can also often be said to be oriented towards protection of the individual. 
Hence, it is understandably reluctant to allow this to be interfered with from the outside, for instance by 
incorporating international law without asking any further questions. After all, it is possible that the protection 
offered by international law is less than that offered by the EU – so why settle for less? This applies for instance 
to such things as passenger rights related to air travel, to maritime issues, or aspects of environmental 
protection. 
The second nuance is related: it is by no means incompatible with the desire to protect the EU legal order that 
individual protection should be at a premium: it may be expected that those whose interests the EU protects 
will see the EU in a good light, express their support and loyalty and therewith help to boost the legitimacy of 
the integration project. In other words, by prioritizing individual protection the CJEU kills two birds with one 
stone: it protects the individual and does justice in the case before it, and at the same time enhances the 
legitimacy of the political project it is a part of. If it is accurate to claim, along vaguely Weberian lines, that 
legitimacy is the scarcest political currency, then resorting to inter-legality may well help to legitimize the role 
of judges and their political authority.30  
Inter-legality has little to do with constitutionalism if constitutionalism refers to any kind of formal 
constitutional act. There is no treaty ordaining inter-legality (and article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on 
its own is insufficient), no domestic public law (although some rules and treaties may contain a renvoi), no 
basic instrument – although there are some cases from various jurisdictions, grappling with similar issues and 
seemingly pointing in the same direction. Likewise, there is little connection between inter-legality and any 
notion of formal hierarchy, as so often associated with constitutional thought. Indeed, formal hierarchy is 
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anathema. Part of the point of inter-legality is to counter ideas about formal hierarchies, and instead do justice 
in individual cases, regardless of issues of formal hierarchy. 
Much the same applies to substantive hierarchy - albeit perhaps to a lesser extent. To the extent that 
constitutionalism is based on particular values, inter-legality ignores this particular terminology, knowing all 
too well that values may clash, and that much depends on who gets to articulate them with authority at any 
rate.31 This is the point where many liberal constitutionalist international lawyers have gone wrong and shot 
themselves in the foot: the true liberal cannot rank values without becoming incoherent, with the result that 
either all values are constitutional, or none are. Either way, the notion of constitutionalism does little work.  
More inductive analysis is of little help. It is one thing to say that international lawyers recognize the idea of jus 
cogens norms and obligations erga omnes, but these too may clash, or even be set aside by invoking an 
awkward distinction between procedure and substance, as the Ferrara case illustrates. But that said, there is 
one point perhaps where values come in, and that is the value of doing justice in individual cases. The point to 
note though is that this seems to be unrelated to any official notions of hierarchy, whether these are based on 
formal indicators or substantive ones. Few people would hold that consumer protection is a matter of jus 
cogens, and yet it is possible to discern different levels of protection and prioritize the legal system offering the 
higher level over the one offering the lower level – there is no need to resort to concepts of jus cogens or 
obligations erga omnes to justify such a move. At best, perhaps it can be said that recognition of a norm as 
belonging to such a category creates a prima facie assumption that the right it protects should indeed be 
protected – such seems to be the assumption underlying the decision of Italy’s Constitutional Court. But even 
so, few rules have been identified as being of jus cogens nature by general acclamation, and even with those 
rules much depends on framing. The International Court of Justice has thus far only held that the prohibition of 
genocide is captured by the idea of jus cogens, yet even the planned slaughter of more than a million people 
for reason of their ethnicity, as the European Court of Human Rights unwittingly demonstrated not so long ago 
with respect to the Armenian genocide of 1915, is far from certain to be characterized as genocide, judging by 
a fairly recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights. 
In retrospect, it seems clear that the debate on the constitutionalization of international law bit off far more 
than it could chew. Constitutions are normally supposed to be doing several things (setting up a political 
community and deciding who is in and who remains out, setting up checks and balances between the 
institutions of government, setting out a procedure for law-making, protecting some basic values perhaps), yet 
the very idea of international law doing all this seems, in retrospect, rather over-ambitious. Equally in 
retrospect, the over-ambitiousness may well have been inspired by the overwhelming nature of the issues 
(globalization, fragmentation, deformalization), and for a brief moment, constitutionalization must have looked 
like the miracle cure, the snake oil that would cure all evils all at once. In retrospect, it is no surprise that 
constitutionalization failed with a bang. 
But what is left among the debris is a valuable idea, taken up by entrepreneurial courts and developed a little, 
case-by-case, incident by incident, without grand labels and grand designs: in a world where classic models of 
authority have all but disappeared, where law-making takes place in uncoordinated ways across and between 
networks, where traditional notions of legal responsibility can do little work because it is unclear who is 
responsible for what, in such a world the best one can hope for is that legal decision-makers are inspired to do 
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the right thing, whatever exactly the right thing may be. In a pluralist and networked world, it may be difficult 
to recognize what would command general respect, but at least it is sometimes obvious what would command 
general abhorrence.32 Syria using chemical weapons on Syrians is wrong, regardless of whether Syria is under a 
legal obligation to abstain from using chemical weapons; UN peacekeepers bringing cholera to Haiti is wrong, 
regardless of whether the blame ultimately rests with the UN, with the Nepalese authorities, with the rich UN 
member states insisting on involvement of the private sector in order to give expression to their market 
ideology, or with the Haitian sub-contractors. Shielding a state from liability for slavery by invoking state 
immunity is wrong, as is invoking the authority of the superior order when denying people access to local 
justice when they find themselves blacklisted by the Security Council. Where legal spaces interact and 
intersect, the only possible guideline should be the plight of the people affected – the only possible guidelines 
can be a combination of a deep, intuitive sense of justice and what Aristotle referred to as phronesis, i.e. 
practical wisdom. 
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